In 1938, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to guarantee the minimum wage to every employee who qualifies.' In section 206(a)(4), the Act specifically guarantees the right to minimum wage to seamen employed on American vessels. 2 Unfortunately, the statutory language of this section leaves open to debate the extraterritorial coverage of the FLSA when the ship is a foreign vessel, transitorily reflagged with the American flag.
Today, parties often litigate to determine whether the benefits of an American statute may be exercised extraterritorially. 3 While scholars concede that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond territorial boundaries, U.S. courts are very reluctant to apply an American statute extraterritorially. When determining whether an American statute will be used overseas, the two methods utilized by the courts are the choice of law and statutory interpretation approaches. 4 A court, in deciding a choice of law issue, first identifies the rules of law of the countries having contact with the case. The court then chooses the nations' law which best satisfies the interests of the countries and the needs of the parties. 5 In contrast, a court using a statutory interpretation analysis does not weigh the contacts of each country with the case, but rather looks to the wording of the American statute to see if Congress intended the statute to be used overseas. 6 One author has stated that the intent of Congress is to be "gathered from the language used [in the statute]." ' 7 This casenote suggests that the recent Third Circuit decision, Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping Inc. , ' is correct in holding that statutory interpretation is the appropriate analysis to determine whether the FLSA is applicable to foreign seamen employed on temporarily reflagged vessels operating entirely outside the United States, its waters, and territories.
This casenote will be organized as follows: first, a description of the facts leading up to the case; second, a brief history of the FLSA and its role in the international arena; third, an overview of the rulings of the district court and the Third Circuit; fourth, an examination of the Third Circuit's opinion; and finally, a concluding paragraph stating that the Third Circuit properly employed a statutory interpretation analysis.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CRUZ DECISION
In 1980, war broke out between Iran and Iraq. 9 This war threatened to disrupt neutral shipping operations in the Persian Gulf. Consequently, in 1986, the U.S. government, after consulting with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor, allowed eleven Kuwaiti oil and liquefied gas tankers which were crewed by Filipino seamen to be reflagged with the American flag so that the ships could be protected by American naval forces in the Persian Gulf.' 0 Under American law, the reflagging of the Kuwaiti ships had to comply with U.S. maritime laws requiring American ownership of the vessels," adherence to safety regulations, and fulfillment of manning requirements. 1 2 Following the reflagging of the ships, the eleven vessels 12. 46 U.S.C. S 8103 (1987) . The reflagged ships were crewed by Filipino seamen. Presently, section 8103(b)(1) requires that each unlicensed seamen be a U.S. citizen or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence with a limitation of twenty-five percent placed on the number of aliens. However, at the time the tankers were reflagged, 46 U.S.C. S 8103(b) permitted the use of non-U.S.
citizen crew members while a vessel was on a foreign voyage and did not stop at a U.S. port. Thus, pursuant to the version of section 8103(b) in effect at the time, the reflagged tankers were permitted to retain their unlicensed Filipino crewmen. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 221. crewed by Filipino seamen operated uninterrupted in their shipping routes under the protection of a U.S. Navy escort in transporting petroleum between the Persian Gulf and Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. None of the reflagged vessels ever entered a U.S. port. 13 Subsequently, the Filipino seamen employed on the reflagged vessels brought suit in U.S. district court claiming that they were entitled to minimum wages and benefits under the FLSA. 1 4 On its face, the FLSA provides protection of minimum wage to all seamen employed on American vessels involved in commerce or an enterprise engaged in commerce.' 5 In Cruz, the question became whether the FLSA could be applied to foreign seamen employed on American reflagged vessels operating outside of the United States and its waters. Because the district court struggled with the idea of applying the FLSA overseas in this particular case, an examination of the history of the Act is helpful to understand the district court's dilemma.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
In Cruz, the district court struggled with idea of applying the FLSA overseas. This struggle stems from the history of the FLSA and annotated case law. The FLSA's history suggests that Congress intended the Act to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Furthermore, U.S. courts often impose a presumption against extraterritorial application of the FLSA. As will be illustrated, however, the facts of Cruz do not lend themselves to the application of this presumption.
A. History of the Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA was enacted to protect against unfair labor practices in the United States. "Except perhaps for the Social Security Act, (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: . .. (4) if such employee is employed as a seaman on an American vessel, not less than the rate which will provide . . . for the period covered .. .wages equal to [the minimum wage].
[the FLSA] is the most far-reaching, far-sighted, program for the benefit of workers ever adopted here or in any other country.' 1 6 Thus, in 1938, President Roosevelt signed a statute that has affected millions of workers, has been the source of vigorous support and opposition, and has withstood many court challenges. 17 The real beginning of the FLSA occurred in New Zealand in 1894 and in Australia in 1896.1' Programs were started in these countries to establish minimum wage rates for certain categories of workers. 19 Later, England enacted a similar statute in 1909.20 After the apparent success of the European acts, the United States began passing statutes at the state level, beginning with Massachusetts in 1912. 21 After the individual states developed minimum wage and hour statutes, President Roosevelt started advocating federal legislation to regulate these matters. 22 In 1933, President Roosevelt announced that "as the Depression continued and unemployment increased, it became apparent that such things as hours and conditions of labor ... and minimum wages could not be entrusted solely to individual bargaining or even collective bargaining, but required public protection. ' ing workers' hours. ",24 Thus, President Roosevelt laid the groundwork for the FLSA. President Roosevelt realized that some members of the voting public would object to federal regulation of private industry minimum wage and hour standards. He attempted to quell these objections by stating that "[a]ll but the hopelessly reactionary will agree that to conserve our primary resources of man power, government must have some control over maximum hours, minimum wages, the evil of child labor, and the exploitation of unorganized labor." '2 5 Aside from the minimum wage laws enacted in other countries and at the state-level in the United States, another major influence in the statutory framework of the FLSA was the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). 26 Like the FLSA, the NIRA established codes of fair practice that included minimum wage standards. But even more significantly, Congress learned from the NIRA that in order to be effective, an act needed a simple and efficient enforcement program. Unfortunately, the NIRA failed on this point. Instead of being incomplex, enforcement of the NIRA was very complicated, thereby injuring its forcefulness. gress to draft a simple, clear document, one of the most difficult problems with the FLSA has turned out to be whether certain segments of industry are covered by the Act. 3 2 Scholars have noted that the FLSA is vague in defining coverage.
3 3 This phenomenon made it very difficult for the Cruz court to determine the effects of the Act on Filipino seamen employed on the American reflagged vessels which operated outside the United States.
B. Case Law: Establishing a Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application
It is well-established in American case law that all congressional legislation is presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
3 4 This presumption is vital because it serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.
5 Therefore, at the initial stages of analysis a court will assume that the FLSA applies only within the United States.
Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company
In Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., the Seventh Circuit established the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the FLSA.
6
John Pfeiffer was hired in 1974 in Chicago by Wm. Wrigley Co. to be the Director of the company's Eastern European office.
3 7 Later, he was transferred to Munich, Germany, where he continued to do similar office work. In 1983, however, when he turned sixty-five, Pfeiffer was fired. Pfeiffer brought suit pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
3 8 The Seventh Circuit ruled that Pfeiffer could not use the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as a basis for his suit because he worked outside of the United States. The Seventh Circuit's rationale for its holding was that Congress did not intend for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be 32 ', Section 213(f) states that the FLSA "shall not apply with respect to any employee whose services during the work-week are performed in a workplace within a foreign country.1"42 The Seventh Circuit noted that other jurisdictions have held that, when read together, these statutes stand for the principle that certain portions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the FLSA cannot be utilized by an employee who works outside of the United States. Based upon its interpretation of the FLSA, the Seventh Circuit created a presumption against the extraterritorial application of the Act .
In Pfeiffer, the Seventh Circuit also stated its policy reasons for establishing the presumption against extraterritorial application of the FLSA. First, the Seventh Circuit noted that courts dislike outright collisions between domestic and foreign law and seek to avoid them.4 Second, the Seventh Circuit stated that "it is more plausible to interpret a statute of the United States as having reach beyond the territory when it is international in focus like the Trading with the Enemy Act." 4 The Seventh Circuit determined that the Age Discrimination ployees were entitled to protection even though they worked overseas. 4 However, after this case was decided, Congress immediately passed section 213(o of the FLSA to prohibit the use of the FLSA extraterritorially. Recall that section 213(f) is the foreign workplace exemption. In essence, The Seventh Circuit found in Pfeiffer that Congress, by enacting the foreign workplace exemption, showed great hostility to the Court's attempt to allow extraterritorial application of the FLSA in Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc. In lPfeffer, the Seventh Circuit used this action of Congress as a further reason for adhering to the presumption that the FLSA cannot be used abroad.4 9 With this historical background in mind, the district court in Cruz was very reluctant to afford protection of the FLSA to foreign seamen working on a reflagged American vessel which had never entered a U.S. port. However, Cruz differs from the facts of Jfezffer in some significant ways which show that the presumption against extraterritorial application of the FLSA does not apply in Cruz.
Cruz Case: The Presumption Does Not Apply
Unlike PfWffer, Cruz does not deal directly with applying sections of the FLSA in another country. The issue in Cruz was whether foreign seamen could claim benefits under the FLSA while working on American reflagged ships. Therefore, the presumption set forth in Ifa'ffer is not on point. As originally passed, the FLSA exempted from the minimum wage requirement "any employee employed as a seaman."" In 1961, Congress amended the FLSA so that seamen employed on American vessels were protected under the Act. 51 An "American vessel" is defined as "includ[ing] any vessel which is documented or numbered under the laws of the United States.''52 In Cruz, the eleven reflagged vessels were registered under the laws of the United States so that the ships could fly the American flag." 3 The reflagged tankers could have arguably met the definition of an "American vessel" under the FLSA.
Because the FLSA in Cruz was not to be applied in a foreign country, but rather on American reflagged vessels, the presumption that the FLSA cannot be utilized overseas clearly does not apply. In fact, the Third Circuit stated, 48 . Id. at 377. Therefore, the presumption of Pfeiffer is not directly applicable and the issue becomes whether a statutory interpretation or choice of law analysis is appropriate to determine the international scope of the FLSA. With this factual backdrop in mind, this casenote will now examine the holding of the district court in Cruz.
III. CRUZ DECISION

A. District Court Decision
In Cruz, the district court held that the Filipino seamen could not claim benefits under the FLSA. In arriving at this decision, the district court reasoned that a choice of law analysis was needed to establish which body of law should apply.
5 5 Possible choices were American, Filipino, or Kuwaiti law. Because the Filipino seamen only alleged a claim under the FLSA, they were left without a remedy when the court decided that American law did not apply.
56
In their argument to the court, the Filipino seamen contended that the FLSA governed the dispute. In contrast, the defendant companies argued that U.S. law did not apply 57 under a choice of law test set out in Lauritzen v. Larsen 58 and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis. 9 Like Cruz, these cases dealt with the application of an American statute to foreign seamen serving on vessels.60 The two cases together set out an eight-factor test to determine whether the United States has a sufficient interest in the litigation to apply its law. 61 The eight factors of the Lauritzen-Rhoditis test include the place of the wrongful act, the law of the flag, the allegiance or domicile of the injured, the allegiance of the shipowner, the place of contract, the inaccessibility of a foreign forum, 54 . Id. at 235, n.1. 
1992]
the law of the forum, and the shipowner's base of operations.
6 Ultimately, in Cruz the district court held that under the Lauritzen-Rhoditis choice of law analysis, American law did not apply.
63
In Cruz, the district court did not discuss a statutory interpretation analysis of the FLSA. 64 The district court reasoned that the use of the 
Lauritzen v. Larsen: Setting Up a Choice of Law Test
The eight-factor choice of law 66 test used by the district court in
Cruz derives from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lauritzen. In
62.
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-92; Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 309. 63. The district court also held as an alternative holding that even if the FLSA did apply, the plaintiff seamen were not entitled to relief under the Act because they were not engaged in commerce, nor did the defendants constitute an enterprise engaged in commerce. Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 809. To be covered by the FLSA, seamen must meet the statutory requirements. First, the seamen should be engaged "in commerce" or employed by an "enterprise engaged in commerce." See 29 U.S.C. S 206(a). The plaintiffs contended that a ship was considered part of the territory of the nation of the flag it flies; therefore, all trading done by the American-flagged vessels would be commerce. Id. at 819. The district court rejected this argument by stating that "ship as territory" terminology is a legal fiction used by the courts to resolve choice of law questions. The district court reasoned that this makes the plaintiffs' contention regarding the reflagged vessels insufficient to bring it within the commerce requirement. Id. The district court also held that plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants constitute an enterprise engaged in commerce. Id. at 821. In addition, the district court also held that the Filipino seamen were not entitled to the protection because they came under the foreign workplace exception found in the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. $ 213(f).
64. See generally Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 809-16. 65. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 577. 66. The district court conducted the following choice of law analysis to conclude that American law did not apply. The district court noted that the place of the wrongful act was either in the Philippines, where the employment contract was entered into, or in Kuwait, Europe and Japan, where the seamen were paid. Cruz, 738 F. Supp at 816. Also, while the law of the flag favored applying the law of the United States, the allegiance of the seamen was to the Philippines. Id. Pursuant to their employment [Vol. 3:177 that case, the Court considered the applicability of the Jones Act 67 to foreign seaman working on foreign ships.68
The facts of the case are rather simple. While temporarily in New York, a Danish seaman joined the crew of a ship of Danish flag owned by a Danish citizen. Later, the seaman was negligently injured aboard the ship while engaged within the scope of his employment in a Havana harbor. The seaman sued the ship's owner in an American federal district court pursuant to the Jones Act. 69 In pertinent part, the Jones Act provides that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law. .. .'"o The Court noted that if the Jones Act were read literally, Congress had extended American law to all alien seamen injured anywhere in the world. 71 Like Cruz, the key issue in Lauritzen was whether a U.S. statute should be applied to a maritime incident. Such liberal language in the Jones Act presented a problem of statutory interpretation for the Court as to whether the Act was intended to be applied to foreign events. 7 " The Court stated, Congress could not have been unaware of the necessity of construction imposed upon courts by such generality of language and was well warned that in the absence of more definite directions than are contained in the Jones Act it would be applied by the courts to foreign events, foreign ships and foreign seamen only in accordance with the usual doctrine and practices of maritime law.
74
Because the Jones Act did not provide any jurisdictional limitation on its face, the Court was forced to use choice of law principles governing maritime tort claims to decide whether American law applied. 75 contracts, the seamen had access to the Philippines' courts to air their grievances. Id. at 817. The district court also noted that application of the American minimum wage to the crews of the reflagged ships would directly conflict with Philippine regulations. The Court included in the choice of law analysis the following factors: 1) the place of injury; 2) the country of the ship's flag; 3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured seamen; 4) the allegiance of the shipowner; 5) the place of contract 6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; 7) and the law of the forum. 76 
Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis: The Final Element of the Choice of Law Test
The final factor added to the Lauritzen-Rhoditis choice of law test derived from Rhoditis. 79 Like Lauritzen, Rhoditis also stemmed from a case involving the Jones Act. 80 The eighth factor added by the Supreme Court to the choice of law test is "considering the shipowner's base of operation." 8 '
In Rhoditis, the Court was again faced with the expansive language of the Jones Act and whether Congress intended for the Act to be 76. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-91. 77. The following commentary is a detailed explanation of the choice of law factors in the Lauritzen case. The "place of the wrongful act" factor is the solution most commonly accepted by courts in tort actions. The rule is to apply the law of the place where the acts giving rise to the liability occurred, the lex loci ddicti commissi. Id. at 583. The "law of the flag" factor gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag of the ship. Each state under international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and acquiring authority over it. Id. at 584. The "allegiance or domicile of the injured" factor considers that each nation has a legitimate interest that its nationals and permanent inhabitants are not injured. Id. at 586. The "allegiance of the defendant shipowner" factor examines the theory that a state or country is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries, but only when the rights of other nations are not infringed. Id. at 587. The "place of contract" factor is fairly self explanatory. In essence, the law of the country where the contract was made governs the case. Id. at 588. The "inaccessibility of a foreign forum" factor examines whether justice requires adjudication under a particular country's law to save seamen expense and loss of time in returning to a foreign forum. Id. at 589-90. Finally, the "law of the forum" factor states that if a forum has perfected its jurisdiction over the parties and defendant does more or less frequent and regular business within the forum state, the forum state should apply its own law to the controversy. applied to foreign events. A Greek seaman, employed under a Greek contract, sought recovery under the Jones Act for injuries he suffered on a Greek ship while in American territorial waters. 8 2 The significant factor noted by the Court was that the ship was operated by a defendant whose largest offices were in New York and New Orleans and whose stock was owned by a U.S. domiciliary. 83 The Supreme Court held that under a choice of law analysis, the Jones Act was applicable to the Greek seaman because the owner's primary base of operations was in the United States.
1 4 Thus, the Supreme Court added the eighth factor to the Lauritzen-Rhoditis test.
Together, these two Supreme Court cases formed the LauritzenRhoditis choice of law test used by the district court in Cruz to hold that the FLSA did not apply to the Filipino seamen. The Filipino seamen appealed their case to the Third Circuit. 8 5 Even though the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, the Third Circuit contended that the FLSA did not apply to the foreign seamen based on a statutory interpretation analysis, rather than on a choice of law analysis.
B. Third Circuit Decision
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion in Cruz; therefore, once again the Filipino seamen on the American reflagged vessels were not covered by the FLSA.8 The Third Circuit, however, delivered a split opinion. While the concurring opinion affirmed on the Lauritzen-Rhoditis choice of law analysis employed by the district court, the judge writing the main opinion for the Third Circuit affirmed on different grounds. 87 He used a statutory interpretation instead of a choice of law analysis to examine the applicability of the FLSA.
88
In Cruz, the Third Circuit offered two reasons in support of its holding that a statutory interpretation analysis is the appropriate method to determine whether the FLSA may be used overseas. First, the Third 
Id.
88. Despite the fact that the Third Circuit used a statutory interpretation analysis, the Third Circuit held that the foreign seamen were not engaged in commerce nor were they employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce covered by the FLSA; therefore, the FLSA did not protect the seamen. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 226-32.
1992]
Circuit opined that, unlike the Jones Act in Lauritzen, the FLSA may be applied to seamen outside of the United States because the FLSA sets out within its own statutory framework the reach of the Act. 92 to support the position that statutory interpretation analysis is the correct method of analysis.
Scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act Within the Statutory Framework
In Cruz, the Third Circuit noted that the FLSA limits its coverage of seamen within the statutory framework of the Act. As discussed earlier, the Lauritzen-Rhoditis choice of law test involved cases which dealt with the application of the Jones Act. Recall that the Jones Act is very broad on its face and appears to allow recovery to all foreign seamen who are injured anywhere in the world. 93 Because the language of the Jones Act is so all-encompassing, the Supreme Court used choice of law principles to determine whether American law applied in those cases.
94
In contrast, in Cruz the Third Circuit opined that Congress, in enacting the FLSA, specifically considered the coverage of seamen. Within the statutory framework of the FLSA, Congress imposed a twopart requirement before coverage will attach. 96 First, the seamen must be involved "in commerce" or employed by an "enterprise engaged in commerce.'"" Second, the seamen must be employed on an American vessel. 9 The Third Circuit noted that if the foreign seamen could fulfill the two-part test and no statutory exemption applied, then they should be entitled to protection under the FLSA. The Third Circuit stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would be to conclude that Congress' power to legislate is subject to the court's invocation of choice of law principles."
99
Because the FLSA limits its application on its face, the Third Circuit reasoned that a statutory interpretation analysis was appropriate 89 and had other various contacts with the nation of its flag. 1 0 7 Even though the members of the crews were represented by a foreign union, the National Labor Relations Board stated that the crews were required to hold representation elections according to the provisions of the NLRA.1 08 By asserting its authority in this manner, the Board provoked the foreign government to vigorously protest against United States interference with its shipping procedures and thereby implicitly invited the suit. 1 9 The foreign union appealed the Board's decision. Thus, the question for the Supreme Court was whether the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act extended to foreign crews engaged in such maritime operations. 110 The application of U.S. law to foreign-flag ships and their crews has arisen often. 11 " ' To determine whether the NLRA applied in these situations, the Board had developed a test balancing the relative weight of a ship's foreign contacts with its American contacts. "1 2 The "balancing of contacts" test used by the Board was very similar to the choice of law test employed by the Court in Lauritzen. After applying this balancing of contacts test in McCulloch, the Board determined that the actions of the foreign vessels were within the coverage of the Act and ordered the foreign crews to hold representation elections." [Vol. 3:177 law but in our international relations as well. In addition, enforcement of Board orders would project the courts into application of the sanctions of the Act to foreign-flag ships on a purely ad hoc weighing of contacts basis. This would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in actual practice. The question, therefore, appears to be more basic; namely, whether the Act as written was intended to have any application to foreign registered vessels employing alien seamen.
The Court stated that a statutory interpretation analysis was the proper approach to determine the scope of the statute.
1 1 6 The Court found that in order for the Board to have jurisdiction, the acts of the foreign entities needed to fit within the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act." 7 Thus, the Court looked to statutory interpretation to determine the international scope of the Act, not to a choice of law analysis." American Radio Ass'n, another case that adhered to the use of statutory interpretation as opposed to a choice of law analysis. In Windward, the Supreme Court was faced with the application of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) to American unions picketing foreign ships which employed foreign nationals." 9 The Court went directly to the language of the LMRA to determine whether the facts of the case and the actions of the picketers fit within the coverage of the Act. The Court also looked to the legislative history of the Act. 
128.
Id. at 1227-28 (Supreme Court held that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of U.S. firms that employ American citizens abroad. The employee's evidence, while not totally lacking in probative value, fell short of demonstrating the clearly expressed affirmative congressional intent that is required to overcome the well-established presumption against statutory extraterritoriality. The employee argued unpersuasively that Title VII's "broad jurisdictional language" which extended the Act's protections to commerce "between a State and any place outside thereof" evinced a clear intent to legislate extraterritorially. The language relied on was ambiguous, did not speak directly to the question presented, and constituted boilerplate language found in any number of congressional acts, none of which had been held to apply overseas).
129. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 219. 130. Id.
[Vol. 3:177
The Third Circuit supported its analysis with two findings. First, the Third Circuit opined that the statutory framework of the FLSA limits its applicability by imposing certain requirements."' 112 The Third Circuit reasoned that if foreign seamen could fulfill the rigorous statutory requirements of the FLSA, then the seamen should be extended the protection of the Act. Second, the Third Circuit found that a statutory interpretation analysis was appropriate based on case law. The Third Circuit cited Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc., EEOC, Windward Shipping (London) Ltd., and McCulloch.' 33 In all of these decisions, the Supreme Court used a statutory interpretation method rather than a choice of law analysis to determine the international scope of a federal statute.
The concurring judge in Cruz, who advocated the use of a choice of law approach, challenged the main opinion's analysis by citing EEOC. 3 The concurring judge stated that EEOC, which held that Title VII does not apply overseas, stands for the presumption discussed earlier in this casenote that congressional legislation is presumed to apply only within the United States unless one can show a "clearly expressed" and "affirmative" intent to the contrary.' 35 The concurring judge noted that the FLSA does not contain specific words, such as conflicts of law text, to show that Congress intended for it to be applied extraterritorially.
3 6 The concurring judge stated that "[i]f Congress had intended to resolve conflicts between the FLSA and other nations' labor laws in favor of American law, it was required to draft the FLSA in a manner which affirmatively and clearly expressed such intent."' 3 7
The concurring judge reasoned that without such an intent, a choice of law analysis was required in Cruz to determine whether the FLSA could be applied overseas to foreign seamen.
The concurring judge is incorrect for relying on EEOC to support a choice of law analysis." 3 In EEOC, it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to utilize the presumption that a federal statute does apply abroad because in that case the plaintiff sought to apply Title VII in a foreign 131 . Id. at 224.
132. Recall that according to 29 U.S.C.A. S 206(a), the seamen must be engaged in commerce or involved in an enterprise affecting commerce. Also, the seamen must be on an American ship. 
V. CONCLUSION
In Cruz, the Third Circuit properly held that a statutory interpretation method will be the correct analysis when determining whether the FLSA is applied overseas to foreign seamen on American reflagged vessels. The position held by the district court and the concurring judge of the Third Circuit which advocates a choice of law analysis raises questions of legal accuracy when applied to FLSA coverage of foreign seamen. In short, Cruz sets out the proper procedure for reviewing international coverage of the FLSA with regard to seamen, a statutory interpretation analysis.
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